

# Draft I: Why You Don't Want to Install Software

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<http://www.tech-archive.net/Archive/Windows/microsoft.public.windows.server.sbs/2004-11/6658.html>

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**From:** Andrew M. Saucii, Jr. (*spam-only\_at\_2000computer.com*)

**Date:** 11/27/04

Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2004 23:08:20 -0500

I've prepared the first draft of a document I hope to convince my boss to distribute to our clients in hopes of drastically reducing the number of local administrators we have lurking around our networks. I figured others might benefit from this, so I'm posting it here. Anyone who cares to contribute is more than welcome to do so. It may well need to be fleshed out a bit, but I'm hoping that by the time I'm finished, my SBS clients in particular will come to me and plead, "Please don't let me install software— you do it."

## "Why You Don't Want to Install Software"

Many of you may believe that installing software is part of having a computer, much like placing bread into a toaster is part of owning a toaster, or filling the gasoline tank is part of owning an automobile. The idea of contacting your network consultant to install software probably sounds as necessary as having a pet consultant to put food in your pet's bowl. In this document we will endeavor to demonstrate why software installation must be left to professionals.

In earlier versions of Windows— namely, those descended from DOS, the 3.x/9x/ME line— there was only one type of user, the "super user." Any user could install software. Any user could access any file on the hard drive. Any user could modify or delete any file on the hard drive. Any user could trash the entire operating system, just by deleting or modifying one file. And trash they did. Windows 9x was notoriously unstable and fragile. Installing one program could cause other programs to stop working. Moreover, this was long before adware, spyware, malware, e-mail scams, and Internet!

Microsoft knew that this model would be woefully inadequate for an operating system on which businesses would depend to conduct their affairs. If a home user trashed his computer, he could curse a bit, reformat, reinstall, and get over it. Businesses would not tolerate that sort of instability. They would need some security. The idea of an operating system that allowed anyone to do anything— like an ATM that consisted of nothing more than a stack of \$100 bills in an open drawer on a street corner with a pencil and a sheet of paper for people to record what they had withdrawn—

simply would not suffice.

Enter Windows NT. This was Microsoft's operating system for businesses. It was redesigned from the bottom to the top, and one improvement that was built-in security. Users fell into one of two main groups— administrators and users. Administrators would install programs, while users would run them. Programs would be installed into a "Program Files" folder, and this folder as well as the Windows system folders were off-limits to users. Key parts of the system registry were also off-limits. That would prevent accidental (or intentional) deletions and modifications. If a user attempted to execute a virus-laden program, the operating system would prevent it from doing any serious damage, simply because the key folders were protected. The days of system instability were numbered— or so everyone thought.

Let's jump to today. Windows XP, a descendent of Windows NT (and, later, Windows 2000) is now the dominant desktop operating system. We all know that system instability and fragility are with us as much as ever. Systems are routinely reformatted and reimaged. Cleanup of adware and spyware is a commonplace task for the network consultant. What on earth happened?

Somewhere along the way, the application vendors got lazy and careless. They started writing software that would run only if the user was made an administrator. They never tested their software under ordinary user accounts. In short, they just didn't give a hoot. Consultants were stuck making everyone administrators because otherwise the applications wouldn't run, and the application vendors either didn't even know the difference between an administrator and a user or they simply wouldn't support running their programs as a user. Users didn't help, either— they insisted that they needed to be able to install software.

The situation today is critical. Because users are generally allowed to be administrators, not only can they consciously install software, but they can inadvertently install trojans, adware, and spyware, sometimes without even clicking "Yes" to anything. Antivirus and anti-spyware software can stop some of these pests from gaining a foothold in a system, but basically the workstation is wide-open for serious damage to be done. We've returned to the bad, old days of Windows 3.1.

The single most effective defense against adware, spyware, trojans, and viruses is simply not to allow users to be administrators. When these attempt to install, Windows will stop them dead in their tracks if the user is not an administrator. For this to be effective, however, users must agree not to be administrators and to leave software installation to professionals. Professional network consultants, or network managers, have the experience to deal with glitches that may arise during installation. Furthermore, tools now exist to help the network manager to determine exactly what has to be done to make an application run with ordinary user privileges— but this process is not trivial and does require the experience of a professional.

In summary, then, you don't want to be an administrator of your workstation because the power to install software also gives anything running with your name and password the power to install software— and the power to destroy your system beyond simple repair. Even experienced network consultants don't run their own office workstations with administrator accounts for everyday tasks. So stay behind the white line and leave the driving to us!