Draft I: Why You Don't Want to Install Software
From: Andrew M. Saucci, Jr. (spam-only_at_2000computer.com)
Date: 11/27/04
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Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2004 23:08:20 -0500
I've prepared the first draft of a document I hope to convince my
boss to distribute to our clients in hopes of drastically reducing the
number of local administrators we have lurking around our networks. I
figured others might benefit from this, so I'm posting it here. Anyone who
cares to contribute is more than welcome to do so. It may well need to be
fleshed out a bit, but I'm hoping that by the time I'm finished, my SBS
clients in particular will come to me and plead, "Please don't let me
install software-- you do it."
"Why You Don't Want to Install Software"
Many of you may believe that installing software is part of having a
computer, much like placing bread into a toaster is part of owning a
toaster, or filling the gasoline tank is part of owning an automobile. The
idea of contacting your network consultant to install software probably
sounds as necessary as having a pet consultant to put food in your pet's
bowl. In this document we will endeavor to demonstrate why software
installation must be left to professionals.
In earlier versions of Windows-- namely, those descended from DOS, the
3.x/9x/ME line-- there was only one type of user, the "super user." Any user
could install software. Any user could access any file on the hard drive.
Any user could modify or delete any file on the hard drive. Any user could
trash the entire operating system, just by deleting or modifying one file.
And trash they did. Windows 9x was notoriously unstable and fragile.
Installing one program could cause other programs to stop working. Moreover,
this was long before adware, spyware, malware, e-mail scams, and Internet!
Microsoft knew that this model would be woefully inadequate for an
operating system on which businesses would depend to conduct their affairs.
If a home user trashed his computer, he could curse a bit, reformat,
reinstall, and get over it. Businesses would not tolerate that sort of
instability. They would need some security. The idea of an operating system
that allowed anyone to do anything-- like an ATM that consisted of nothing
more than a stack of $100 bills in an open drawer on a street corner with a
pencil and a *** of paper for people to record what they had withdrawn--
simply would not suffice.
Enter Windows NT. This was Microsoft's operating system for businesses.
It was redesigned from the bottom to the top, and one improvement that was
built-in security. Users fell into one of two main groups-- administrators
and users. Administrators would install programs, while users would run
them. Programs would be installed into a "Program Files" folder, and this
folder as well as the Windows system folders were off-limits to users. Key
parts of the system registry were also off-limits. That would prevent
accidental (or intentional) deletions and modifications. If a user attempted
to execute a virus-laden program, the operating system would prevent it from
doing any serious damage, simply because the key folders were protected. The
days of system instability were numbered-- or so everyone thought.
Let's jump to today. Windows XP, a descendent of Windows NT (and, later,
Windows 2000) is now the dominant desktop operating system. We all know
that system instability and fragility are with us as much as ever. Systems
are routinely reformatted and reimaged. Cleanup of adware and spyware is a
commonplace task for the network consultant. What on earth happened?
Somewhere along the way, the application vendors got lazy and careless.
They started writing software that would run only if the user was made an
administrator. They never tested their software under ordinary user
accounts. In short, they just didn't give a hoot. Consultants were stuck
making everyone administrators because otherwise the applications wouldn't
run, and the application vendors either didn't even know the difference
between an administrator and a user or they simply wouldn't support running
their programs as a user. Users didn't help, either-- they insisted that
they needed to be able to install software.
The situation today is critical. Because users are generally allowed to
be administrators, not only can they consciously install software, but they
can inadvertently install trojans, adware, and spyware, sometimes without
even clicking "Yes" to anything. Antivirus and anti-spyware software can
stop some of these pests from gaining a foothold in a system, but basically
the workstation is wide-open for serious damage to be done. We've returned
to the bad, old days of Windows 3.1.
The single most effective defense against adware, spyware, trojans, and
viruses is simply not to allow users to be administrators. When these
attempt to install, Windows will stop them dead in their tracks if the user
is not an administrator. For this to be effective, however, users must agree
not to be administrators and to leave software installation to
professionals. Professional network consultants, or network managers, have
the experience to deal with glitches that may arise during installation.
Furthermore, tools now exist to help the network manager to determine
exactly what has to be done to make an application run with ordinary user
privileges-- but this process is not trivial and does require the experience
of a professional.
In summary, then, you don't want to be an administrator of your
workstation because the power to install software also gives anything
running with your name and password the power to install software-- and the
power to destroy your system beyond simple repair. Even experienced network
consultants don't run their own office workstations with administrator
accounts for everyday tasks. So stay behind the white line and leave the
driving to us!
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- Reply: Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz SBS Rocks [MVP] : "Re: Draft I: Why You Don't Want to Install Software"
- Reply: SuperGumby [SBS MVP]: "Re: Draft I: Why You Don't Want to Install Software"
- Reply: Tobias Redelberger: "Re: Draft I: Why You Don't Want to Install Software"
- Reply: Lanwench [MVP - Exchange]: "Re: Draft I: Why You Don't Want to Install Software"
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