Re: Replication of password resets/unlocks
- From: "Jorge Silva" <jorgesilva_pt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2006 00:53:20 +0100
That is quite a hodgepodge from different documents. There are problems in
there.
This isn't from different documents!!! This is technical reference. If MS is
wrong... Well sometimes there isn't some consistency in some documents at
the first glance.
First off, I know it isn't your fault, but the name urgent replication
implies something that it isn't guaranteed to be.
Well the name urgent replication is used to distinguish the normal
replication process from the changes that triggers immediate replication
instead of waiting the default period of 15 seconds (or 300 seconds on
domain controllers that are running Windows 2000).
Of course this doesn't mean that all DCs will be automatically updated once
that urgent replication occurs, I agree with you on that.
Second off, there isn't such a thing as urgent replication to the PDC.
There is an out of band update that occurs which is a special RPC call
that isn't replication based to get info to the PDC.
To my knowledge, this occurs in the case of a password change (assuming
AvoidPDCOnWan isn't set) but not for a lockout. What can occur for a
lockout is that as a password is tested and is incorrect, the password
attempt is chained to the PDC (again if AvoidPDCOnWan is not enabled) and
the lockout will occur at the same time on the two DCs. In actual fact,
the lockout can occur before the lockout on the local DC if for some
reason another DC was queried along with the first, then two DCs are
sending attempts to the PDC. For instance, say you send an auth request
with a bad password to DC2 and to DC3, assuming a simple auth attempt with
no additional auth providers that means one bad on password hit on DC2 and
DC3 and 2 bad password hits on DC1 (the PDC).
Makes sence to me, but isn't true that :
- An account lockout is urgently replicated to the PDC emulator and is then
urgently replicated to the following:
*Domain controllers in the same domain that are located in the same site as
the PDC emulator.
*Domain controllers in the same domain that are located in the same site as
the domain controller that handled the account lockout.
* Domain controllers in the same domain that are located in sites that have
been configured to allow change notification between sites (and, therefore,
urgent replication) with the site that contains the PDC emulator or with
the site where the account lockout was handled.
???
If authentication fails at a BDC, the authentication request is passed
immediately to the PDC, which is guaranteed to have the current password.
Because a user cannot specify the domain controller on which
the password change is attempted, an attack of this type
requires an advanced tool.
Eheheh, well not by default... But we can change that.
--
I hope that the information above helps you
Good Luck
Jorge Silva
MCSA
Systems Administrator
"Joe Richards [MVP]" <humorexpress@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:OimXm%23LlGHA.4828@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
That is quite a hodgepodge from different documents. There are problems in
there.
First off, I know it isn't your fault, but the name urgent replication
implies something that it isn't guaranteed to be. Fast. The actual
implementation is urgent queuing and the queued ops are the same priority
as a normal queued op of the same type. So if you hit a bridgehead (which
you must do if crossing site lines even if using change notification) that
is backed up with inbound replication requests, even though the request
was urgently queued, it can take awhile for that information to get into
the bridgehead and then replicated back out.
Second off, there isn't such a thing as urgent replication to the PDC.
There is an out of band update that occurs which is a special RPC call
that isn't replication based to get info to the PDC.
To my knowledge, this occurs in the case of a password change (assuming
AvoidPDCOnWan isn't set) but not for a lockout. What can occur for a
lockout is that as a password is tested and is incorrect, the password
attempt is chained to the PDC (again if AvoidPDCOnWan is not enabled) and
the lockout will occur at the same time on the two DCs. In actual fact,
the lockout can occur before the lockout on the local DC if for some
reason another DC was queried along with the first, then two DCs are
sending attempts to the PDC. For instance, say you send an auth request
with a bad password to DC2 and to DC3, assuming a simple auth attempt with
no additional auth providers that means one bad on password hit on DC2 and
DC3 and 2 bad password hits on DC1 (the PDC).
Because a user cannot specify the domain controller on which
the password change is attempted, an attack of this type
requires an advanced tool.
Not really a very advanced tool, a two line script could be a good start.
This is propaganda to make folks feel more secure. :)
--
Joe Richards Microsoft MVP Windows Server Directory Services
Author of O'Reilly Active Directory Third Edition
www.joeware.net
---O'Reilly Active Directory Third Edition now available---
http://www.joeware.net/win/ad3e.htm
Jorge Silva wrote:
Urgent Replications
- Certain important events trigger replication immediately, overriding
existing change notification. Urgent replication is implemented
immediately by using RPC/IP to notify replication partners that changes
have occurred on a source domain controller. Urgent replication uses
regular change notification between destination and source domain
controller pairs that otherwise use change notification, but notification
is sent immediately in response to urgent events instead of waiting the
default period of 15 seconds (or 300 seconds on domain controllers that
are running Windows 2000).
- Urgent Active Directory replication is always triggered by certain
events on all domain controllers within the same site. When you have
enabled change notification between sites, these triggering events also
replicate immediately between sites.
Between Windows Server 2003-based and Windows 2000-based domain
controllers in the same site, immediate notification is caused by the
following events:
*Assigning an account lockout, which a domain controller performs to
prohibit a user from logging on after a certain number of failed
attempts.
*Changing the account lockout policy.
*Changing the domain password policy.
*Changing a Local Security Authority (LSA) secret, which is a secure form
in which private data is stored by the LSA (for example, the password for
a trust relationship).
*Changing the password on a domain controller computer account.
*Changing the relative identifier (known as a "RID") master role owner,
which is the single domain controller in a domain that assigns relative
identifiers to all domain controllers in that domain.
- Urgent Replication of Account Lockout Changes
Account lockout is a security feature that sets a limit on the number of
failed authentication attempts that are allowed before the account is
"locked out" from a further attempt to log on, in addition to a time
limit for how long the lockout is in effect.
- The PDC emulator receives urgent replication of account lockouts. In
Active Directory domains, a single domain controller in each domain holds
the role of PDC emulator, which simulates the behavior of a Windows NT
version 3.x-based or Windows NT 4.0-based PDC. In Windows NT domains, the
only domain controller that can accept updates is the PDC. If
authentication fails at a BDC, the authentication request is passed
immediately to the PDC, which is guaranteed to have the current password.
- An account lockout is urgently replicated to the PDC emulator and is
then urgently replicated to the following:
*Domain controllers in the same domain that are located in the same site
as the PDC emulator.
*Domain controllers in the same domain that are located in the same site
as the domain controller that handled the account lockout.
* Domain controllers in the same domain that are located in sites that
have been configured to allow change notification between sites (and,
therefore, urgent replication) with the site that contains the PDC
emulator or with the site where the account lockout was handled.
- These sites include any site that is included in the same site link as
the site that contains the PDC emulator or in the same site link as the
site that contains the domain controller that handled the account
lockout.
In addition, when authentication fails at a domain controller other than
the PDC emulator, the authentication is retried at the PDC emulator. For
this reason, the PDC emulator locks the account before the domain
controller that handled the failed-password attempt if the
bad-password-attempt threshold is reached.
- Note: When a bad password is used in an attempt to change a password,
the lockout count is incremented on that domain controller only and is
not replicated. As such, an attacker could try (of domain
controllers)*(lockout threshold -1) + 1 guesses before the account is
locked out. Although this scenario has a relatively small impact on
account lockout security, domains with an exceptionally high number of
domain controllers represent a significant increase in the total number
of guesses available to an attacker. Because a user cannot specify the
domain controller on which the password change is attempted, an attack of
this type requires an advanced tool.
- Replication of Password Changes
Password changes are replicated differently than both normal (non-urgent)
replication and urgent replication. Changes to security account passwords
present a replication latency problem wherein a user's password is
changed on domain controller A and the user subsequently attempts to log
on, being authenticated by domain controller B. If the password has not
replicated from A to B, the attempt to log on fails. Active Directory
replication remedies this situation by forwarding password changes
immediately to a single domain controller in the domain, the PDC
emulator.
- In Active Directory, when a user password is changed at a domain
controller, that domain controller attempts to update the respective
replica at the domain controller that holds the PDC emulator role. Update
of the PDC emulator occurs immediately, without respect to schedules on
site links. The updated password is propagated to other domain
controllers by normal replication within a site.
- When the user logs on to a domain and is authenticated by a domain
controller that does not have the updated password, the domain controller
refers to the PDC emulator to check the credentials of the user name and
password rather than denying authentication based on an invalid password.
Therefore, the user can log on successfully even when the authenticating
domain controller has not yet received the updated password. On domain
controllers that are running Windows Server 2003 or Windows 2000 Server
with SP4, if the authentication is successful at the PDC emulator, the
PDC emulator replicates the password immediately to the requesting domain
controller to prevent that domain controller from having to check the PDC
emulator again.
- If the update at the PDC emulator fails for any reason, the password
change is replicated non-urgently by normal replication.
For clients that are running Windows NT 4.0 or clients that are running
Windows 95 or Windows 98 without the Directory Service Client Pack, the
client attempts to contact the PDC emulator. If the client has the
Directory Service Client Pack installed, the client contacts any domain
controller and the contacted domain controller then attempts to contact
the PDC emulator.
- Note: The Group Policy setting "Contact PDC on logon failure" can be
disabled to keep a domain controller from contacting the PDC emulator if
the PDC emulator role owner is not in the current site. If this setting
is disabled, the password change reaches the PDC emulator non-urgently
through normal replication.
.
- Follow-Ups:
- Re: Replication of password resets/unlocks
- From: Joe Richards [MVP]
- Re: Replication of password resets/unlocks
- References:
- Re: Replication of password resets/unlocks
- From: Jorge Silva
- Re: Replication of password resets/unlocks
- From: Joe Richards [MVP]
- Re: Replication of password resets/unlocks
- Prev by Date: Re: A real tough one with DCPromo
- Next by Date: Re: A real tough one with DCPromo
- Previous by thread: Re: Replication of password resets/unlocks
- Next by thread: Re: Replication of password resets/unlocks
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|
Loading