Re: disabling password request when connecting from the LAN
From: Steve Riley [MSFT] (steriley_at_microsoft.com)
Date: 01/03/05
- Next message: Jeremy Lang: "Re: Event ID 50: MUP and WinDFS, plus event ID 26: lost delayed write data."
- Previous message: Taylor Sbicca: "Re: PEAP-MS-CHAP v2 Certificate Problem"
- In reply to: Herb Martin: "Re: disabling password request when connecting from the LAN"
- Next in thread: Herb Martin: "Re: disabling password request when connecting from the LAN"
- Reply: Herb Martin: "Re: disabling password request when connecting from the LAN"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ]
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2005 14:35:07 -0800
> Seems the hashing is actually applied to each 7-byte half
> individually.
That's true only for LM "hashes" (I put that in quotes because it really
isn't a hash in the true definition of the term). And in networks that still
use LM "hashes," it's true that 7 characters is better than 8 because of
the way the cracking programs divide the hash in two.
NTLM and NTLMv2 create true hashes of the entire password at once, not two
7-byte halves.
I'm now using a 25-character passphrase on all my accounts. It would take
more storage than exists on the planet to store rainbow tables for 25-character
phrases; brute-force attacks would take approximately 500,000 centuries even
accomodating for Moore's law. :)
Steve Riley
steriley@microsoft.com
> "Steve Riley [MSFT]" <steriley@microsoft.com> wrote in message
> news:32434632402986863949856@news.microsoft.com...
>
>> Do you remember exactly what it was you witnessed? Your mention of a
>> "BIG computer" leads me to believe you might have seen someone
>> demonstrate
>>
> rainbow
>
>> tables or something simliar--software that precomputes all possible
>>
> hashes.
>
>> There's really very little defense against something like that. Yes,
>> the use of only a password as an authenticator is rapidly reaching
>> the end of its useful life.
>>
> No, not off the top of my head -- I might think of enough
> to get a Google search to track it down and if I do then
> I will let you know but (you know me pretty well) I was
> completely convinced on using at least 15 characters
> for all secure systems and have done so every since.
> This has the added advantage of disabling the LANMAN hash for THAT
> user even if the domain in question does not turn it off for everyone.
>
> There are also (very good) arguments that 7 is more secure than 8,9 10
> unless you go all the way to 14 but this 'feature' may have changed in
> recent OS versions.
>
> Seems the hashing is actually applied to each 7-byte half
> individually.
>
>> Steve Riley
>> steriley@microsoft.com
>>> "Steve Riley [MSFT]" <steriley@microsoft.com> wrote in message
>>> news:31807632402788220414480@news.microsoft.com...
>>>
>>>>> Consider that even a 14 character password with partial complexity
>>>>> is not difficult to break (about 10-20 seconds with current
>>>>> technology) though.
>>>>>
>>>> Herb -- this is a little alarmist since complexity can vary wildly.
>>>> What
>>>>
>>> Yes, it certainly alarmed me when I saw it done that easily.
>>>
>>>> kind of "partial complexity" do you have in mind that would fall so
>>>>
>>> rapidly?
>>>
>>> 14-characters, upper/lower case, and numbers was the actual case.
>>>
>>> The password was otherwise highly random.
>>>
>>>> And what do you mean by "break"? Be more precise: you can guess
>>>> passwords, you can crack hashes.
>>>>
>>> It was cracked (I believe) -- 20 seconds but it was a BIG computer.
>>>
>>> One the other hand it was only ONE computer. With distributed
>>> attacks, you can figure it gets worse.
>>>
>>>> Passwords that fall in 10 to 20 seconds are usually extremely weak
>>>>
>>> passwords
>>>
>>>> that cracking programs have either already generated the hashes for
>>>> or can generate the hash instantly -- meaning dictionary words,
>>>> words with
>>>>
>>> numbers
>>>
>>>> appended at the end, obvious substitutions (like zero for O, 4 for
>>>> A, and so on).
>>>>
>>> Not in this case -- it was highly random.
>>>
>>>> Steve Riley
>>>> steriley@microsoft.com
- Next message: Jeremy Lang: "Re: Event ID 50: MUP and WinDFS, plus event ID 26: lost delayed write data."
- Previous message: Taylor Sbicca: "Re: PEAP-MS-CHAP v2 Certificate Problem"
- In reply to: Herb Martin: "Re: disabling password request when connecting from the LAN"
- Next in thread: Herb Martin: "Re: disabling password request when connecting from the LAN"
- Reply: Herb Martin: "Re: disabling password request when connecting from the LAN"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ]
Relevant Pages
|